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RECENT DECISIONS
elude recovery on a policy containing the "death by suicide" clause. Ladwig v.
The National Guardian Life Insurance Company, (Wis. 1933) 247 N.W. 312.
The court placed this decision on the doctrine stated in two earlier cases:
Cady v. Fidelity Ins. Co., 134 Wis. 322, 113 N.W. 967, 17 L.R.A. (N.S.) 260
(1908), and Pierce v. Traveler's Life Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 389 (1873). In the Pierce
case the court decided that the words "death by his own hand" were synony-
mous with the term "suicide"; and the doctrine set forth in both the Pierce and
Cady cases was that the use of the term "suicide" imports into the contract,
"that one who dies as a result of his own act is not within the exception, unless
the act was intentional, and committed by him at a time at which he was con-
scious of the nature of the act, and of its immediate and direct consequences,
although without criminal or felonious intent."
By the great weight of authority the "suicide, sane or insane" clause ex-
cepts from liability the insurer in every case of self-destruction, Bigelos( v. In-
surance Campany, 93 U.S. 284, 23 L.Ed. 918 (1876); Streeter v. Society, 65
M\ich. 201, 31 N.W. 780, 8 Am. St. Rep. 883 (1887) ; Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co.
v. Blitn, 258 Fed. 901, 169 C.C.A. 621 (1919); Moore v. Northwestern Mutual
Life Insurance Co., 192 M\ass. 468, 78 N.E. 488, 7 Ann. Cas. 656 (1906) ; Illinois
Bankers' Life Association v. Floyd (Tex. Com. App.), 222 S.W. 967 (1920);
see notes 7 Ann. Cas. 659; 35 A.L.R. 166; except where the death is accidental;
Union Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Payne, 105 Fed. 172, 45 C.C.A. 193
(1900) ; Parker v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 289 Mo. 42, 232 S.W. 708 (1921) ; Parker
v. New York Insurance Co., 188 N.C. 403, 125 S.E. 6, 39 A.L.R. 1085 (1924) ; see
37 C.J. 553. In Harten v. Sovereign Camp, XV.O.W., 124 S.C. 397, 117 S.E. 409
(1923), it is apparently held that even death by accident if self-inflicted, is within
the clause.
This decision, then, is far from the weight of authority, which deviation the
court expressly admits, along with the conclusion that the word "insane" is
practically stricken from the policy thereby in Wisconsin. On this construction
of the clause, however, Wisconsin does not seem to stand alone. See Supreme
Lodge v. Gelbke, 198 Ill. 365, 64 N.E. 1058 (1902); Zerulla v. Supreme Lodge,
223 Ill. 518, 79 N.E. 160 (1906) ; Vicars v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 158 Ky. 1,
164 S.W. 106 (1914) ; and New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dean, 226 Ky. 597, 11 S.W.
(2d) 417 (1928).
CLEM1ENS H. ZEIDLER.
MUNICIPAL CORPORTIOS.-ZONING-POLICE PowER.-Upon petition of the
relator, and after the issue formed by return of an alternative writ had been
tried, the circuit court issued a peremptory writ of mandamus, addressed to the
inspector of buildings in the City of Milwaukee, commanding him to issue the
necessary permit authorizing the erection of buildings and other improvements
for a cut stone plant and yard upon certain premises owned by the relator in
the City of Mfilwaukee. The building inspector appeals, justifying refusal of
a permit under the city zoning ordinance, which restrained use of the relator's
property to residential purposes, and made said property part of a residential
area. Held, judgment affirmed. Defendant's property is a block of land in an
industrial center, valuable for industrial purposes, condemned to a use for resi-
dential purposes, and for such purposes it is comparatively valueless. Ordi-
nance, insofar as it places relator's property in a residential district, is utterly
unreasonable and void. State ex rel. Tingley v. Gurda, (Wis. 1932) 243 N.W. 317.
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The validity of so-called zoning laws authorizing a municipality to prescribe
zoning districts and of ordinances enacted pursuant thereto has been established
beyond question. State ex rel. Carter v. Harper, 182 Wis. 148, 196 N.W. 451, 33
A.L.R 269 (1923). See also Building Height Cases, 181 Wis. 519, 195 N.W. 544
(1923). The policy and degree of such regulatory zoning measures is quite
largely a matter of legislative discretion. Courts are not disposed to be hyper-
critical in construing such ordinances in practical operation. Bouchard v. Zetley,
196 Wis. 635, 220 N.W. 209 (1928). It has been well stated that "state legisla-
tures and city councils who deal with the situation from the practical stand-
point, are better qualified than the courts to determine the necessity, character,
and degree of regulation which these new and perplexing conditions require;
and their conclusions should not be disturbed by the courts unless clearly arbi-
trary and unreasonable." Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 47 Sup. Ct. 770, 71 L.Ed.
1229 (1926).
Unless the ordinance passes the bounds of reason or exceeds the bounds of
powers delegated to the city council, the courts are reluctant to declare it in-
valid. Thus classifications by a legislature permitting higher buildings in cities
of the first class than in other urban centers, and exempting entirely certain
types of structures have been upheld. Building Height Cases, supra. So-called
curb setback provisions in zoning ordinances have also been upheld. Bouchard
v. Zetley, supra. However, a zoning ordinance providing that "no building shall
be erected" is construed as looking to the future and having no retroactive ef-
fect. Rosenberg v. Village of Whitefish Bay, 199 Wis. 214, 225 N.W. 838 (1929) ;
State ex rel. Klefisch v. Wis. Telephone Co., 181 Wis. 519, 195 N.W. 544 (1923).
That such ordinances in some instances operate with harshness and seem op-
pressive does not render them invalid. Hayes v. Hoffman, 192 Wis. 63, 211 N.W.
271 (1927). Where the interest of the individual conflicts with the interest of
society, such individual interest is subordinated to the general welfare.. C. B. &
Q. Railway Co. v. Drainage Conrm'rs, 200 U.S. 561, 26 Sup. Ct. 341, 50 L.Ed.
596 (1906). But like limitations must be imposed upon all neighbors. See Piper
v. Ekern, 180 Wis. 586, 194 N.W. 159, 34 A.L.R. 32 (1923).
But it should be remembered that when the bounds of legislative discretion
are exceeded, courts will deny validity to the offending ordinance. The case of
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 Sup. Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed.
302 (1926) points out the test for determining whether such bounds of legisla-
tive discretion have been overstepped, the court stating, "The line which in this
field separates a legitimate from an illegitimate assumption of power is not capa-
ble of precise delimitation. It varies with circumstances and conditions .....
If the validity of the legislative classification for zoning purposes be fairly de-
batable, the legislative judgment must be allowed to control." Applying a similar
test in a case where the general character of the surroundings was such that the
appellate court could not say that the legislative body was not warranted in de-
claring the district residential, the Wisconsin Supreme Court did not disturb a
finding that an undertaking parlor violated zoning restrictions. LaCrosse v. El-
bertson, 205, Wis. 207, 237 N.W. 99 (1931).
The principal case well illustrates the limitation of "reasonableness" upon a
municipality's power to declare a district residential in character. While the
zoning power may be used to protect a residential area from the encroach-
ments of business and industry, it may not be used to condemn to residential
purposes property in an industrial locality, surrounded by property devoted to
uses repugnant to use for residential purposes. Parkway and boulevard de-
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velopments contemplated at some future time by a city planning commission d9
not justify such "utterly unreasonable" use of the zoning power. And, although
city planners, before whose sometimes overzealous vision ugly industrial struc-
tures and unsightly factory sites vanish to be replaced by planned parkways
and tree-lined boulevards, may regret the holding in the principal case, the
logic of that decision will recommend itself to property owners whose more
mundane interests are concerned with possible profitable uses and present sale
values of their properties.
ROBERT W. HANSEN.
PATENTS-EMPLOYER AND EmPLOYEE-JURISDICTION OF CouRTs.-Respondevf
is exclusive licensee of letters patents issued to D and L, who were employed,
during the conception and development of the invention, in the Bureau of
Standards, a Sub-Division of the Department of Commerce. D and L were
employed in the radio section and engaged in research and testing in the labora-
tory. While performing their regular tasks they experimented at the laboratory
in devising apparatus for operating a radio receiving set by alternating current
with the hum incident thereto eliminated. The invention was completed Decem-
ber 10, 1921. Before its completion no instructions were received from and no
conversations relative to the invention were held by these employees with the
head of the radio section, or with any superior. They also conceived the idea
of energizing a dynamic type of loud speaker from an alternating current
house-lighting circuit, and reduced the invention to practice on January 25, 1922.
March 21, 1922, they filed an application for a "power amplifier' The concep-
tion embodied in this patent was devised by the patentees without suggestion,
instruction, or assig'muent from any superior. Suit to have the respondent de-
clared trustee of the inventions for the United States and to require respondent
to assign the patents therefore to the United States. Decree dismissing the bill
affirmed on appeal, 59 F. (2) 381 (C.C.A 3d, 1932) ; writ of certiorari. Held,
decree affirmed. It was conceded by respondent that the government had free
but non-exclusive use of the patented inventions, by virtue of shop-rights.
United States v. Dutbilier Condenser Corporation, 53 Sup. Ct. 554, 77 L.Ed. 695
(1933).
The respective rights and obligations of employer and employee, touching
an invention conceived by the latter, spring from the contract of employment.
If the employment be general, albeit it covers a field of labor and effort in the
performance of which the employee conceived the invention for which he ob-
tained a patent, the contract is not so broadly construed as to require an assign-
ment of the patent. Dalzell v. Dueber Watch Case Mfg. Co., 149 U.S. 315, 13
Sup. Ct. 886, 37 L.Ed. 749 (1893). Where a servant during his hours of em-
ployment, working with his master's materials and appliances, conceives and
perfects an invention for which he obtains a patent, he must accord his master
a non-exclusive right to practice the invention, McClurg v. Kingsland, 1 How.
202, 11 L.Ed. 102 (1843) ; Solo-mons v. United States, 137 U.S. 342, 11 Sup. Ct.
88, 34 L.Ed. 667 (1890).
No servant of the Unifdd States has by statute been disqualified from apply-
ing for and receiving a patent for his invention, save officers and employees of
the Patent Office during the period for which they hold their appointments,
Rev. St. § 480, U.S. Code, tit. 35, § 4. In Soloynons v. U. S., supra, it was said:
"The government has no more power to appropriate a man's property invested
